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Abstract 
An organization’s ability to successfully manage information security incidents is determined by the 
actions of its employees, as well as the actions of various groups of employees within its 
organizational boundaries. To date, information security research has primarily focused on 
individual-level phenomena and has not yet explored group-level phenomena such as how employee 
groups recognize and respond to security incidents in a way that is consistent with the organization’s 
security goals and objectives. The current study addresses this gap, thereby answering the research 
call for group-level security research perspectives. The present study explores how employee groups 
formulate their collective security efficacy, which influences how group members recognize and 
respond to information security incidents. Using a case study of a large healthcare research 
organization (HRO), we analyze two security incidents, a malware attack, and a physical security 
breach, to identify a unique set of ecological and social properties of employee groups that are salient 
to their collective security efficacy. 
Keywords: Collective Security Efficacy, Information Security, Socioecological Theory, Social 
Disorganization Theory, Employee Groups, Thematic Analysis 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, information security incidents 
have become a growing concern for organizations. One 
key takeaway is that no industry or organization is 
immune to security breaches (e.g., Anthem, Home 
Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Kaspersky Labs, RSA, and 
Target). When security incidents occur, an 
organization’s ability to manage the incident depends 
on more than just the actions of its security 
professionals or its formal incident response teams. It 
also depends on the actions of its nonsecurity staff 
employees (Dutta & Roy, 2008). Of course, employees 
do not act solely based on their individual beliefs and 
experiences; rather, the workplace group to which they 
belong influences them (Bandura, 2000; Warkentin, 
Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011). These groups, termed 
here employee groups, are collections of individuals 
who “are interdependent because of the tasks they 
perform as members of a group, who are embedded in 
one or more larger social systems (e.g., community, 
organizations), and who perform tasks that affect 
others (such as customers or coworkers)” (Guzzo & 
Dickson, 1996, p. 308). An employee group explicitly 
or implicitly guides the employee’s security response 
actions (Bandura, 2000; Paepcke, 1996; Sampson, 
Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). These actions can include 
policy compliance behavior (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
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Benbasat, 2010; Johnston, McBride, Carter, & 
Warkentin, 2016), protective security actions (Boss, 
Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015), or proactive 
responses, such as reporting suspicious employee 
behavior (Straub & Welke, 1998). We believe that an 
employee group serves as the foundation upon which 
its members’ security incident responses are formed. 
An employee group influences its members’ security 
responses based on the employee group’s collective 
ability to recognize and respond to the incident in a 
manner that is consistent with the organization’s 
security goals and objectives, defined here as collective 
security efficacy. For instance, the recent breach of the 
United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
(Gallagher, 2015) was a social engineering attack that 
accessed the records of government workers and 
contractors holding US government security clearance. 
Several factors can influence how employees respond 
to such threats and one of these factors is the employee 
group and its ability to leverage resources and 
appropriate processes to successfully mitigate 
enterprise threats. In this context, a group security 
response is the coordinated and synergistic interpretation 
of the attack and the formation and communication of a 
cohesive response behavior expectation of the group’s 
members. However, some organizational employee 
groups are more capable and effective in this regard than 
others (Chua, Wareham, & Robey, 2007; Lesser & 
Storck, 2001). In this research, we discover why. 
Although academics and practitioners have focused 
considerable energy on understanding the factors that 
shape and support security incident responses 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013), 
the dominant perspective applied to this phenomenon 
has been at the individual level, supported by theories 
devoted to individual perceptions, motivations, and 
behaviors within the organization. These theories 
provide insight into how employees uniquely perceive 
and engage with security policies, mandates, and other 
activities when internal security incidents occur 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). However, research on group-
level security incident response is lacking (Siponen, 
Willison, & Baskerville, 2008). Some authors note that 
the existing research on group-level security is 
inadequate and inconclusive, conflicted, or lacking 
clarity (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Ultimately, 
academics’ and practitioners’ preoccupations with 
individual-level security perspectives and the 
                                                     
1 A synthesis of the literature from the SDT does not coalesce 
around a standard label for the properties discussed in this 
manuscript. For instance, Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) refer to 
the ecological context (e.g., residential instability and 
poverty) and structural conditions (e.g., social ties and social 
capital) while Markowitz et al. (2001) refer to the macro, 
economic, and ecological conditions (e.g., poverty and ethnic 
and racial heterogeneity) and structural characteristics (e.g., 
cohesion). More recently, Kingston et al. (2009) refer to 
inadequacy of group-level security insights effectively 
blind researchers in understanding how employee 
groups affect individual and organizational 
information security efforts. 
With this view, we conducted a case study using social 
disorganization theory (SDT), a theoretical lens from 
the field of criminology, to understand group-level 
security efficacy. Our findings demonstrate how an 
employee group’s collective security efficacy is 
influenced by its ecological properties and social 
properties. The ecological properties are the 
characteristics of the organizational setting that are 
imposed on an employee group and set the stage for 
the group’s interactions. The social properties include 
the general social dynamics that all workplace groups 
leverage when faced with workplace events that 
warrant employee responses. 1  In the context of 
collective security efficacy, these social properties 
shape an employee group’s efficacy in responding to 
security incidents, which ultimately shape each 
employee’s security responses. The current study 
raises awareness of a gap, caused by a lack of group-
level perspectives, within the existing information 
security strategies, and contributes to the literature by 
providing a more holistic understanding of how 
employee groups influence the individual employee’s 
ability to effectively respond to security incidents. 
In the next section, we synthesize the literature on 
collective security efficacy to conceptually establish 
the ecological and social properties that define it. We 
then discuss our theoretical lens to understand our 
focal phenomenon—the collective security efficacy of 
employee groups. Using semistructured interviews and 
the secondary data of two security incidents—a 
malware attack and a physical security breach—we 
draw conclusions about how socioecological properties 
influence collective security efficacy’s development. We 
conclude with a discussion of our findings, limitations, 
and implications for future research. 
2 The Collective Security Efficacy 
Phenomenon 
We define collective security efficacy as an employee 
group’s ability to recognize and respond to 
information security incidents in a manner that is 
consistent with the organization’s security goals and 
structural characteristics (e.g., residential mobility and 
population heterogeneity) and social structure (e.g., informal 
social control) while Mazerolle et al. (2010) explore 
ecological variables and structural characteristics (referring 
to the development of the social capital theory). Based on this 
review, we note how the literature recognizes two distinct 
groups of variables that we henceforth refer to as ecological 
and social properties. 
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objectives. As this definition suggests, an employee 
group’s collective security efficacy depends the 
coordinative and synergistic interactions and shared 
understanding of its members (Bandura, 2000). For 
example, in situations in which new employees are 
unsure of policies or where policies are nonexistent, 
the group members’ actions help the group recognize 
when it is necessary to improvise their security 
behaviors. More experienced employees assist others 
in interpreting a policy or aid in completing a security 
objective. This sharing of information and insight 
among employees within a group reinforces the social 
relationships and establishes the expectations for how 
group members should respond to security problems 
(Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, & Jianhong, 2001; 
Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Here, an employee 
group’s ability to recognize and respond to information 
security incidents is defined in part by its social 
properties, or the characteristics of the social interactions 
and expectations among employees within a group. An 
employee group’s social properties shape how the group 
interprets information and events and establish the baseline 
level of shared understanding for how the group’s members 
should act when a security incident arises. 
Additionally, this definition embeds employee groups 
within organizational settings, where security incidents 
are a part of the cost of doing business. Consequently, 
there are also the ecological properties of an employee 
group. These ecological properties influence the 
group’s collective security efficacy and represent the 
characteristics of a group, serving as the foundation of 
its social properties. For instance, groups that 
experience a high rate of turnover (an ecological 
property) will have less effective social interactions 
(e.g., introduction interactions) than groups that 
experience less turnover (e.g., bonding interactions). In 
the event of a security incident, the social interactions 
of a group experiencing high turnover will be less 
interactive and more reflective of individual 
experiences, hence reducing the group’s ability to 
collectively respond to the incident.  
Together, an employee group’s ecological and social 
properties define how its members interact, produce, 
share, and reference resources to respond to security 
incidents (Chua et al., 2007). To this extent, these 
properties and their influence on a collective outcome 
describe a socioecological phenomenon—an observable 
occurrence of interrelations among people and their 
environment. A socioecological theory can provide a 
useful lens for understanding this type of phenomenon. 
3 Theoretical Background 
The SDT is a socioecological theory, developed in the 
criminology discipline and focused on the 
relationships among community structure, social 
control, and criminal activity (Sampson & Groves, 
1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Historically, the SDT 
has proven useful for understanding how community-
level properties can deter a residential neighborhood’s 
criminal activity (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The SDT 
posits that criminal activity within and involving 
communities occurs when these communities lack the 
appropriate structures, resources, and social maturity 
to protect themselves and their residents. Our review 
of the SDT literature indicates these structures can be 
decomposed into ecological and social characteristics 
or properties (Markowitz et al., 2001; Mazerolle, 
Wickes, & McBroom, 2010; Sampson & Groves, 
1989) and that ecologically and socially developed 
communities are better able to detect and ameliorate 
threats to their residents’ safety and property. A 
community’s ecological and social strength dictates 
the degree to which it can understand how to govern 
and protect itself (i.e., collective security efficacy), 
resulting in the deterrence of criminal activity. As the 
social interactions among community members 
decrease, the social controls that influence each 
community member’s (i.e., resident’s) behavior 
weaken or fail to form altogether. This weakness then 
facilitates a disorganized environment in which 
community members rely less on the community and 
where criminal activities go undeterred (Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003; Shaw & McKay, 1942). 
Although relatively untested empirically, the SDT 
literature presents a general relational structure: a 
community’s ecological properties influence its social 
properties, which in turn influence its collective 
security efficacy (Kingston, Huizinga, & Elliot, 2009; 
Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Communities with a 
particular range of ecological properties may form and 
maintain stronger social interactions (Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003; Sampson & Groves, 1989). Further, it 
is these social properties of a community that shape its 
collective efficacy (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Sampson 
& Groves, 1989). For instance, communities that have 
high socioeconomic status and low residential 
instability are more likely to have the necessary 
resources and consistency among their residents to 
develop strong social ties. These resources enable 
action in a cohesive and cooperative manner in the face 
of a threat to the community’s security, facilitating a 
strong collective ability to coordinate and respond in 
an effective manner (Drukker, Kaplan, & van Os, 
2005; Sampson & Groves, 1989). Alternatively, 
communities with high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity 
are not as likely to form strong social ties and may be 
less cohesive in situations where cohesion is paramount 
for success, including security incidents. Cultural 
attenuation and both formal and informal social control 
are also influential social properties, with informal 
social control widely seen as the most important social 
property for shaping a community’s collective security 
efficacy (Sampson & Groves, 1989). 
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Table 1 presents an employee group’s contextualized 
ecological properties and the indicators used to 
identify the presence and intensity of the properties in 
the contextual environment. Appendix A provides an 
overview of the original properties discussed within 
the SDT literature and a description of how we 
contextualized these properties to the organizational 
environment. For instance, diversity is a construct 
within organizational research that is the 
contextualized outcome for ethnic heterogeneity. 
Diversity reflects the demographic ecological 
properties that shape the composition of an 
organization’s workforce and includes subdimensions 
such as ethnicity, gender, and religious affiliation, 
among others. Research on diversity in organizations 
generally supports the notion that heterogeneity 
positively affects organizational outcomes because it 
encourages new perspectives and experiences from 
dissimilar backgrounds to be shared (Hubbard, 2004). 
Along with a definition of each property, we also 
present indicators of the properties, showing how they 
manifest within groups in the context of collective 
security efficacy. These indicators allow us to 
differentiate between employee groups with a strong 
ecological foundation and those with weaker 
ecological foundations. This is useful because the 
broader SDT literature indicates that the strength of a 
group’s ecological foundation is a determinant of the 
strength of the group’s social structure (Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003; Sampson & Groves, 1989).  
Table 2 presents an employee group’s social properties 
and the indicators used to distinguish a group with a 
strong social structure from those with weaker social 
structures. These social properties are native to the 
SDT, but as also presented in Appendix A, we 
contextualized them to organizational employee 
groups. Collectively, these indicators identify 
employee groups with a strong social structure, which 
is a requirement of high-level collective security 
efficacy (Browning, 2002; Sampson & Groves, 1989; 
Sampson et al., 1997).  
Table 1. SDT Contextualized Ecological Properties 
Property Definition Source 
Socioeconomic 
status 
The economic and social position of an employee group in terms of its 
members’ education, income, and occupational status. 
Schulz et al. (2012); 
Winkleby & Cubbin 
(2003) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups are at least satisfied with their 
pay and benefits. 
• High-performing employee groups are paid at a rate higher than 
market, based on BLS data or other externally validated criteria. 
• High-performing employee groups have a higher rank within the 
organization. 
Diversity The degree to which an employee group is comprised of members that identify 
with one or more socioculturally distinct groups, including gender, 
educational attainment, ethnicity, cultural affiliation, and sexual orientation. 
Ely and Thomas (2001); 
Sampson & Groves 
(1989) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups are mostly of dissimilar 
ethnicities. 
• High-performing employee groups are mostly of dissimilar 
religions. 
• High-performing inside groups mostly have equal gender 
representation. 
Turnover The degree to which employee group members transfer, resign, retire, or are 
terminated from their position within the group. 
Drukker et al. (2005) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups rarely lose members 
voluntarily to other groups. 
• High-performing employee groups rarely have members that 
transfer to other groups. 
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Table 2. SDT Contextualized Social Properties 
Property Definition Source 
Social ties The social channels that facilitate the exchange of resources among employees 
within an employee group. 
Oh, Chung, & Labianca 
(2004) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups have members that are involved in 
social events outside of the office. 
• High-performing employee groups have members who spend a great 
deal of time together outside of the office. 
Social capital The intangible resources produced via relationships among employees that 
facilitate actions for the mutual benefit of the employee group in terms of the 
group’s structural, relational, and cognitive capital. 
Coleman (1988); 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
(1998) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups have extensive friendships among 
their members. 
• High-performing employee groups have overlapping memberships in 
social groups among their members. 
• High-performing employee groups have an obvious harmony among 
their members. 
• High-performing employee groups have members who often tell 
stories of people or events that took place in the past. 
• High-performing employee groups have members who often share 
metaphors at work. 
• High-performing employee groups have many unspoken rules that 
guide their practice. 
Cohesion An employee group’s propensity for demonstrating resiliency against disruptive 
forces. 
Ronayne (2004) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups have a strong sense of obligation or 
reciprocity toward members in the group. 
• High-performing employee groups exhibit a high degree of trust 
among their members. 
• High-performing employee groups maintain a shared identity (e.g., 
“us” or “we” when referring to the employee group and “they” or 
“them” when referring to others). 
Cultural 
attenuation 
The extent to which normative conventions can be interpreted incorrectly and 
influence employee behavior within the employee group. 
Kornhauser (1978) 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups do not distort communications or 
policies concerning appropriate security behavior. 
• High-performing employee groups review communications or policies 
concerning appropriate security behavior. 
• High-performing employee groups have the ability to direct questions 
or receive feedback from the organization on security policies. 
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Table 2. SDT Contextualized Social Properties 
Social control The formal and informal societal or political influences that shape and govern an 
employee group. 
Kubrin & Weitzer 
(2003) 
Indicator(s): 
• Formal social control 
o High-performing employee groups question their activities 
to determine their accordance with the security policy. 
o High-performing employee groups monitor their activities 
to determine their accordance with the security policy. 
• Informal social control 
o High-performing employee groups question their members 
about their activities to determine if they are in accordance 
with the security policy. 
o High-performing employee groups monitor the activities of 
their members to determine if they are in accordance with 
the security policy. 
In summary, as the leading socioecological theory for 
a collective-level understanding of security issues 
within a community setting (Chua et al., 2007), the 
SDT provides a reasonable lens through which to 
investigate the collective security efficacy 
phenomenon because (1) it is a derivative of 
socioecological theory, a perspective for 
understanding a group’s ability to interact 
internally and with its environment to achieve a 
common goal; and (2) it attends to the 
socioecological properties that define the 
collective security response efficacy phenomenon.  
4 Methodology 
Our approach to examining the focal phenomenon 
utilizes the case study method (Yin, 2002, 2010). Case 
studies focus on “the understanding of the dynamics 
present in single settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534), 
paying particular attention to how a phenomenon is 
embedded within its context (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & 
Wicki, 2008; Keutel, Michalik, & Richter, 2014; Yin, 
2002, 2010). We conducted a case study using 
semistructured interviews and direct observations of 
several employee groups and their responses to two 
security events. We then used thematic analysis 
following the protocol established by Boyatzis (1998) 
to analyze the semistructured interview data and 
reconcile our analysis with our direct observations of an 
employee group’s collective security efficacy. The unit 
of analysis was an employee group. We followed the 
case procedures adopted by Schlagwein and Bjørn-
Andersen (2014) to ensure the robustness of our 
methodological approach and to present our findings in 
a similar fashion to highlight the abstract and concrete 
observations made from our thematic analysis.  
Although prior research indicates that multiple cases 
are preferred over single cases for theoretical 
generalizability, single cases are preferred when a case 
(1) is particularly revelatory due to its inaccessibility 
to researchers, (2) critically evaluates or investigates a 
well-established theory, or (3) is unique and not easily 
replicated because of phenomenological 
circumstances (Keutel et al., 2014; Sarker, Xiao, & 
Beaulieu, 2013; Walsham, 1995; Yin, 2010). Our case 
meets these conditions by (1) investigating a large 
healthcare research organization (HRO) that allowed 
us extensive access to its employees, in-depth 
coverage of several employee groups, and 
organizational documents during a security incident 
event, making this case study difficult to replicate; 
and (2) utilizing a well-established criminology 
theory in a new phenomenological setting.  
The HRO in this study has its headquarters in the 
southeastern US and has over 1.2 million outpatient visits 
annually, along with research facilities that employ over 
20,000 individuals across the country. The HRO consists 
of both healthcare operations and research facilities, and it 
has an executive steering committee that oversees the 
organizational strategy. Moreover, the HRO maintains a 
central security IT function that is responsible for 
responding to security incidents and that must comply with 
a variety of regulatory requirements, including the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA). Within such a regulatory environment, a single 
security incident or compliance failure may result in a 
financial penalty or revocation of the HRO’s ability to 
conduct healthcare operations, sensitive research, or both. 
Both consequences serve as a strong incentive to the 
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HRO’s executive steering committee to encourage security 
incident awareness and training for its employees.2  
Due to the HRO’s comprehensive and complex nature, 
multiple employee groups exist within the 
organization, creating an opportunity to validate our 
observations for analytic generalizability (Yin, 2002) 
while controlling for ecological influences. Although 
all the authors have professional working relationships 
with multiple employee groups within the research 
facilities, two authors also have collaborative working 
relationships with healthcare operations employee 
groups through consulting engagements.  
During the study, we collected primary and secondary 
data (Boyatzis, 1998; Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 
2012; Yin, 2010). Primary data were collected through 
semistructured interviews with members from several 
employee groups (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Stewart 
& Gosain, 2006). Semistructured interviews allow a 
researcher to enter the interview with some initial goals 
via high-level questions that begin the discussion, but 
also engage in improvisation to elicit greater 
understanding and feedback from the interviewee 
concerning a phenomenon (Myers & Newman, 2007). 
This approach enabled us to evaluate the degree to 
which an interviewee understood the questions being 
asked and allowed for reframing and refining the 
interview questions over time to improve our data-
gathering process. The interviewed members possess 
intimate knowledge of the ecological properties of the 
HRO, the unique social dynamics of their respective 
employee groups, and the ability to assess how these 
properties influence their employee group’s collective 
security efficacy (Segars & Grover, 1998). To avoid 
influencing the direction of the interviewee’s 
responses (Myers & Newman, 2007), we did not 
provide examples or rephrased questions until 
prompted by the interviewee.  
To ensure a diverse set of perspectives, we 
purposefully set out to interview employees with 
distinct roles, physical and logical placement, and 
responsibility to their respective employee groups, 
which we found to be representative of the breadth of 
the organization. In total, we interviewed 27 
employees who self-identified with six unique 
employee groups; a final employee group (Group G) 
represented a collection of single employees from four 
distinct employee groups that served as verification for 
theoretical saturation in the data analysis. Table 3 
outlines the descriptive statistics for each employee 
group, including educational attainment, age ranges, and 
gender. Appendix B includes the interview protocol.  
The HRO also asked one of the paper’s authors to 
participate in a safety and security task force as a 
security professional because of a physical security 
breach that occurred within the HRO. This created an 
opportunity for the author to observe, engage, and 
document the affected employee groups and the 
interactions among their respective group members. 
We also collected secondary source data from 
organizational policies (e.g., employee handbook, 
intellectual property agreement, and enterprise code of 
conduct), meeting minutes (e.g., safety and security 
task force), observations from organizational and 
employee group meetings (e.g., new employee 
orientation, social gatherings, etc.), and organizational 
communications relating to security events; this 
information enriched our interpretation of the primary 
data. In particular, we used our direct observations and 
the secondary data to provide a contextual background 
for each of the security incidents investigated in this 
study and to enrich our understanding of the HRO’s 
security operations and work environment. 
We followed a hermeneutic approach to our data 
analysis, moving between “the whole to part and back 
to the whole” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75) to ascertain the 
meaning of our data (Boyatzis, 1998; Cole & Avison, 
2007). To transition between these phases, we used a 
thematic analysis for translating our data to describe 
implicit and explicit ideas and patterns and termed 
themes to understand the focal phenomenon (Boyatzis, 
1998; Guest et al., 2012). Thematic analysis provides 
a structured iterative data analysis process designed to 
reveal theoretical abstractions and generalizations in 
the data to understand the HRO, the employee groups, 
and the ecological and social properties that influence 
collective security efficacy in a reliable manner 
through the use of codebooks. Tables 1 and 2, shown 
earlier, include the definitions of the properties that 
inform the construction of the interview protocol (i.e., 
interview questions) and the indicators that serve as the 
codebook to conduct the thematic analysis coding. In 
doing so, we leverage the literature on the SDT to 
provide a sensitizing lens but rely on the data and our 
interpretations to guide our understanding.
                                                     
2 All employees received initial onboarding training relating 
to information security policies (e.g., acceptable use policy, 
data privacy and security policy, and antidiscrimination 
training). Research-oriented employees receive additional 
training that is relevant to human subjects on a biannual 
basis, and medical-oriented employees receive human 
subjects training as well as refresher training on HIPAA 
compliance. All employees receive organization-wide 
security education awareness training on an ad hoc basis 
periodically through several security assessments (e.g., 
phishing tests, security audits, etc.).  
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Table 3. Employee Group Demographics 
Employee group 
(group size) Work unit type 
Number of 
interviews Gender Avg. tenure 
Educational 
attainment 
A (n = 19) Research / Business development 4 4 male 20 years 4 doctorate 
B (n = 12) Staff / Business development 3 
1 male 
2 female 
12 years 3 master’s 
C (n = 11) Research / Applied sciences 3 3 male 7.7 years 
2 doctorate 
1 master’s 
D (n = 25) Administrative services 6 
3 female 
3 male 
10.4 years 
1 doctorate 
3 master’s 
2 bachelor’s 
E (n = 12) Research / Basic sciences 3 
2 male 
1 female 
13 years 3 doctorate 
F (n = 14) Research / Medical 4 
2 male 
2 female 
15.8 years 4 doctorate 
G (Misc.) n/a 4 
3 male 
1 female 
9.8 years 
3 doctorate 
1 master’s 
To ensure the validity of our study, we focused on 
ensuring our finding’s credibility, reliability, and 
confirmability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). First, we 
adopted the informant feedback approach, where 
members from employee groups provided feedback to 
reduce the potential that our findings “may be biased 
in favor of the perspectives of the researcher, 
excluding important alternative interpretations from 
the informants [members]” (Bygstad & Munkvold, 
2011, p. 41). Second, we assessed the reliability of 
abstract generalizations using a thematic analysis and 
interrater reliability for coding themes found within 
our primary codebook (Landis & Koch, 1977). Using 
Cohen’s Kappa, we calculated an interrater reliability 
of 95.3%, indicating excellent reliability for our 
findings. Lastly, we presented our findings to an 
employee group for discussion and feedback to ensure 
we properly assessed group dynamics and to verify that 
no single employee perspective biased our findings. 
5 Overview and Findings of the 
Case 
All organizations are susceptible to security incidents; 
the HRO investigated in this study is no exception. The 
two security incidents we describe next affected 
multiple employee groups and caused the collective 
security efficacy of each group to be tested. The first 
security incident enabled our research team to 
                                                     
3 Employee groups C, D, E, F, and G (misc) were impacted 
by the malware attack security incident.  
understand how employee groups were defined, the 
ecological properties of various employee groups 
within the organization, and how those properties 
helped to dictate the social structure of the respective 
groups, as identified through their social properties. 
The second incident occurred during our data 
collection for the first incident and allowed us to 
confirm the relationships between a group’s ecological 
properties and its social properties while also 
demonstrating how an employee group’s social 
properties can influence its collective security efficacy 
and subsequent employee security response behavior.  
5.1 Malware Attack Security Incident 
The first security incident was a malware attack that 
plagued information systems and data assets 
throughout the HRO and its various employee groups.3 
In 2013, malware was discovered on one of the HRO’s 
primary domain controllers (server). Because domain 
controllers are integral to the network’s ability to 
authenticate users, they are prime targets for hackers or 
other malicious individuals seeking to disrupt or 
corrupt network operations. The IT department first 
isolated the server to evaluate the extent to which 
the HRO’s systems had been compromised. 
Following an initial investigation, the IT department 
issued a mandatory, organization-wide password 
reset and demanded enhanced requirements for 
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password strength and duration.  
At this point, the IT department believed the situation 
to be contained, and they were in the process of 
resuming normal operations when the central firewall 
detected repeated outbound requests to an unknown 
server on an application port that is commonly used for 
exploitation. Through a log analysis, the IT department 
determined that additional systems had been 
compromised, requiring further investigation. The 
investigation revealed that the initial access to the 
original server occurred several months prior to its 
discovery and was an entry point for a series of attacks 
that included installing malware and key-logging 
software, as well as configuring an open remote 
desktop server. Initially, the hackers had installed 
malware to create a Bitcoin mining farm on employee 
desktops and servers. However, further review 
detected additional malware applications that 
compromised administrative credentials (including 
domain administrator) through key-logging software 
and a brute force attack. Additionally, the initial action 
to force a password reset alerted the malware attackers 
that they had been detected, which resulted in a 
phishing attack against the HRO. The ensuing phishing 
attack mimicked the legitimate password reset 
message and resulted in further compromises 
(including payroll systems). Because the initial 
request for password reset occurred while still-
infected systems were active within the organization, 
affected employees had to change account passwords 
a second time because the first solution resulted in the 
affected employees being compromised a second 
time. Two months after the discovery, the HRO had 
reconfigured all systems, and the overall operating 
conditions were back to normal. 
From an organizational perspective, this particular 
malware attack impacted certain employee groups 
differently than others. The malware attack’s 
resolution took approximately one month from the 
attack’s identification to its removal. Within one 
employee group, roughly 22.5% of the employee 
systems were compromised, resulting in the systems 
being reinstalled. A by-product of these remediation 
actions was the loss of personal information. For other 
groups, the impact was much less severe, with some 
groups not being aware that the attack and recovery 
processes had even occurred.  
Many employees pointed to their respective group’s 
ecological properties and how these properties 
influenced the definition of the group’s membership 
and established the group’s foundation for social 
structure and collective efficacy relative to the attack. 
From the existing contextualized SDT properties, 
socioeconomic status and turnover helped define not 
only whom the group’s members consulted, but also 
how they viewed their respective group’s 
responsibilities in participating in the organization’s 
overall attack-mitigation efforts (e.g., password reset). 
In terms of socioeconomic status, one employee states, 
“The broader the span of control an (employee) has, 
the greater the appreciation for the effects (of security 
concerns)”. Because of their organizational position, 
some employee groups felt obligated to take leadership 
roles in investigating how the attack occurred, 
encouraging members to serve on rapid response task 
forces and governance review committees. Recall that 
for this context, groups with a high degree of formal 
social control would be more likely to question and 
monitor their group’s activities and whether the group 
is acting in accordance with the organization’s security 
policies; they would also help to refine and improve 
those policies where appropriate. They will then 
challenge their members through informal social 
control to engage in the security response activities 
preferred by the group.  
Other groups and their members gave a far more 
passive response. Another employee echoed this 
sentiment, commenting on the difference in responses 
among a group of lesser paid janitors, for example, as 
opposed to a group of top executives: the “latitude and 
freedom” associated with groups comprised of people 
of his “pay grade” would allow for “more discretion on 
how we spend our days and to whom we talk to and 
what we do”. His insinuation is that groups with a 
greater socioeconomic status within the organization 
have greater flexibility and freedom in their response 
to security incidents while groups of a lesser 
socioeconomic status act in a more individualistic 
fashion. Groups acting in a more engaged fashion to 
security incidents demonstrate harmony, a key 
indicator of relational social capital. Their synergistic 
approach is also indicative of cohesion; they work 
together as a group to demonstrate resilience against 
disruptive forces, such as the malware attack 
described in this case.  
In terms of turnover, the groups that were more active 
and responsive to the attacks were the ones that also 
had the greatest retention among their members. Lower 
turnover allowed these groups to draw on the insights 
and experiences of a broad scope of members who had 
“seen it all” or “been there, done that”. Conversely, the 
less-effective groups alluded to turnover within their 
group as having a negative effect on their comfort in 
acknowledging to each other that their role as victims 
in the attack and in sharing beliefs as to how “people 
in our role should help figure out what happened”. This 
speaks to the importance of stability (turnover) as a 
defining ecological property of an employee group. 
Groups with high levels of cohesion have a strong 
sense of emotional support among their members, 
something absent from groups with higher turnover. 
Further, groups with a strong informal social influence 
shape their members’ activities in a manner similar to 
what is described here. 
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Prior literature within the criminology discipline 
indicates that diversity (i.e., ethnic heterogeneity) is an 
influential ecological property that enables the 
formation of collective synergies and outcomes. 
However, interviewees did not cite ethnic, religious, or 
gender diversity as a group property that facilitated 
their group formation or in how they respond to 
security incidents. They did, however, frequently 
mention shared understanding and communication 
effectiveness within their groups as outcomes 
resulting from educational attainment and 
homogeneity. As one employee states:  
From an education standpoint, I think diversity 
affects security greatly. With the more 
education you have, the more knowledge you 
know about a particular area that will influence 
how you go about implementing a particular 
security guideline or policy. It also helps to 
have effective communication. Rules and 
procedures must have a rationale. If I’m sitting 
here and I don’t know anything, that’s an issue. 
This insight, consistent with others from our 
interviews, suggests that for the purpose of forming a 
shared understanding of a security incident and 
establishing ongoing social exchanges concerning the 
incident, all group members must have high levels of 
educational attainment and homogeneity. As groups 
become less homogenous in their levels of educational 
attainment or begin to hold a consistent, but lesser 
degree of educational attainment, they are less likely to 
achieve coordinated, informed security incident 
responses. This anecdote also underscores the 
connection between a group’s educational attainment 
and homogeneity and its social ties, social capital, and 
cultural attenuation. Groups that share a high degree of 
educational attainment in a consistent manner 
(homogeneity) across their members will contribute 
resources and support to their members, which is 
evident in the communication and information-
sharing exhibited in this case. Further, groups that 
have a homogenous level of educational attainment 
exhibit a lesser degree of cultural attenuation, 
minimizing distortion in communication among their 
members because these members review and question 
their group’s desired response. 
Cumulatively, in the HRO, the ecological properties of 
socioeconomic status and turnover clearly defined 
group membership and directly affected how the 
groups shared details of the malware attack incident 
and organized themselves in establishing norms for 
their members’ responses. Presented in Table 4, these 
two properties are carried forward from the SDT. 
Table 4. Ecological Properties Salient to an Employee Group’s Collective Security Efficacy 
Ecological properties Definition 
Socioeconomic status The economic and social position of an employee group in terms of its 
members’ education, income, and occupational status. 
Turnover The degree to which employee group members transfer, resign, retire, or 
are terminated from their position within the group. 
Educational attainment and homogeneity also emerged 
from our thematic analysis as ecological properties of 
employee groups, suggesting a revision to the diversity 
property is germane to the collective security efficacy 
phenomenon. Specifically, the malware incident 
highlights the importance of higher levels of education 
and the homogeneity of an employee group’s 
education for developing a foundation for the group’s 
collective security efficacy. Table 5 provides the 
definition for this emergent property and the 
indicators used to represent high-performing 
employee groups regarding this property. 
As mentioned earlier, the first security incident 
provided us with a background for understanding the 
ecological properties of an employee group’s social 
structure, as represented by its social properties. The 
second incident allowed us to confirm these 
relationships while also observing how a group’s 
social properties inform its collective security efficacy. 
This observation occurred in real time while the HRO 
was investigating and resolving the security incident. 
Due to the timing of this incident, the HRO asked one 
author to participate on an ad hoc, employee incident 
response team (i.e., the safety and security task force), 
allowing us to directly observe and record individual 
employee and employee group perspectives and 
behavior from both an internal (participating author) 
and external (other authors) perspective.
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Table 5. Emergent Ecological Properties Salient to an Employee Group’s Collective Security Efficacy4 
Emergent Ecological 
Property 
Definition 
Educational Attainment and 
Homogeneity 
The degree of educational attainment and similarity in the attainment held by group members 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups have high levels of educational attainment among 
their members. 
• High-performing employee groups have homogenous educational backgrounds 
among their members. 
5.2 Physical Security Breach Incident 
In June 2013, someone reported that one of three 
submaster keys for a single, multilevel building within 
the organization was lost.5 This particular submaster 
key accessed over 60 percent of the office space within 
the building. Shortly after the reported loss, a series of 
thefts occurred, and they included both physical and 
electronic data. The thefts occurred in offices 
accessible by the lost submaster key. Based on internal 
security investigation reports and employee 
observations, the thefts began in early June 2013 and 
continued for a period of about one month, with 
relatively little awareness by most of the HRO’s 
employees. The HRO’s security department 
investigated these initial thefts and concluded a lapse 
in basic security precautions (i.e., locking office doors 
and failure to challenge nonbadged outsiders) was the 
primary cause behind the data thefts. 
A few months after the HRO supposedly resolved the 
initial set of thefts (August 2013), a large theft of 
physical data occurred from a single office. Video 
surveillance showed two external agents posing as 
employees and attempting to gain access to several 
offices.6 The HRO’s security department once again 
pointed to lapses in basic security precautions as the 
cause. However, several employee groups questioned 
this assertion’s validity, resulting in the creation of an 
incident response team. The HRO charged the newly 
created safety and security task force with reviewing 
security documentation and current security practices. 
Based on this review, they were to recommend 
improvements to security processes and infrastructure. 
                                                     
4 We use the term “emergent” to represent properties that are not specified in the SDT literature as traditionally part of the SDT but 
that are revealed by our thematic analysis to be salient to an employee group’s collective security efficacy. 
5 The physical security breach incident impacted employee groups A and B. Although the malware attack security incident affected 
both groups, the interviews for these employees focused solely on the physical security breach incident. 
6 Although the organization maintains a 24-hour operational period due to its medical center, the data theft incident occurred in a 
building that maintains an 8 am to 10 pm operational period, with the “busiest period” occurring between the hours of 8 am and 6 
pm. As a result, the external agents purposely selected a period that reduced potential discovery to conduct their thefts (7 pm to 9 
pm). 
The task force leaders were individuals with the most 
seniority and experience with security incidents. 
Their peers believed the task force’s members 
possessed the highest amount of historical knowledge 
of the employee group, as well the credibility needed 
to share the task force’s recommendations with the 
relevant employee groups. 
During the task force’s deliberations, surveillance 
video revealed that outsiders, posing as legitimate 
employees, were testing doors and not using the lost 
submaster key to gain entry. They were also 
concealing their faces from closed-circuit video 
monitoring. An informal inventory audit resulted in 
several additional data theft reports. At this point, the 
task force provided an initial report reaffirming the 
security department’s conclusions regarding lapses in 
basic security precautions and recommended 
employees maintain a higher level of security 
awareness during business operating hours. The task 
force’s chairperson presented these recommendations 
at a group meeting to reduce confusion concerning the 
recommendations and to explain the rationale for the 
recommendations in light of the evidence reviewed. 
Three weeks after the task force presented this 
recommendation to the employee groups, two 
employees reported that the suspected perpetrators had 
approached them in their offices, seemingly surveying 
the offices for materials of value for future theft 
activity. When challenged (a specific recommendation 
from the task force), the suspects proceeded to ask for 
clarification about visitor procedures and immediately 
left the premises. At this point, employees within 
multiple groups engaged in email exchanges within 
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their respective groups, expressing concerns over the 
earlier internal security investigation’s conclusions 
and concerns for their own physical safety; they 
requested further analysis by the safety and security 
task force in light of these social engineering attempts. 
They also inquired about the existing security policies 
to determine whether modifications should be made to 
both policy and security infrastructure. The security 
task force reviewed their previous deliberations in light 
of this new evidence. 
Our interviews reinforced what we found from the 
malware attack incident: the ecological properties of 
socioeconomic status, educational attainment and its 
homogeneity, and turnover defined employee group 
membership and set the foundation for social 
exchanges to cope with the incident. We found that 
social properties help to refine an employee group’s 
collective security efficacy, contributing to the group’s 
collective ability to recognize and respond to incidents, 
such as the physical security breach described here. 
For instance, one employee comments on her group’s 
ability to manage the physical security breach: 
At work, it’s very collaborative. We spend a lot 
of time together. We like meetings here. But we 
make a lot of group decisions, so it’s not really 
driven down from above. So at work, I think we 
all spend a lot of time together, a lot of 
interaction. Outside of work, there’s some. Not 
a lot, but some. When I think of within my 
group, we run things past me and another 
member before we do so with anyone else, just 
because we want to know how something 
works, why it works, is it possible. 
This illustrates that for groups with strong member 
relationships characterized by frequent and beneficial 
exchanges of knowledge and insights, their members 
were more aware of the physical theft and participated 
more in its investigation. They also used their strength 
of social ties and social capital to help their members 
understand an appropriate perspective of the theft 
incident and how they should navigate discussions 
with peers outside their groups. The group’s cultural 
attenuation was also evident as instrumental in shaping 
how consistent its members were in understanding the 
theft incident. The groups with the most consistency 
among their members, in terms of their understanding 
of the incident and how they should respond to it, were 
those whose members were consistent in how they 
interpreted each other’s perspectives and actions. For 
instance, one employee, when questioned about his 
group and its members’ attenuation from the group’s 
established norms, states the following: 
Well, I think there are some, I do think that they 
are ignored, sometimes, in that people can 
sometimes not take precautions, perhaps, that 
they should. I don’t think that they ignore them 
to willfully break rules, but it could be 
ignorance, literally not knowing what the, how 
to handle a particular some type of information 
or what the rules say for how long the 
information has to be stored and under what 
conditions. So there’s that. I don’t think it’s an 
active defiance in most cases, but it could be 
laziness. I think that’s more attributable to that. 
It’s more passive than an actual defiance of 
rules.  
Our interviews also show the perceived relationship 
between position level and educational attainment, 
where high-level positions are associated with 
researchers or administrators who possess doctorates 
and master’s degrees while lower-level positions have 
less formal education. Through educational 
attainment, groups are able to understand security 
incidents and the importance of security policies, 
hence mitigating risks to the employee group. One 
employee, speaking of his employee group, succinctly 
notes the connection between educational attainment 
and homogeneity to cultural attenuation: 
I’ve worked with people in lower-level 
positions who don’t really have a good grasp 
as to what security policy is…people in higher- 
level positions, they have more knowledge, or 
they’re more computer literate to be able to 
handle security and be able to understand what 
security is about. Whereas, someone in a lower- 
level position, they may not be as 
knowledgeable. 
We also found that an employee group’s cohesiveness 
influenced its ability to maintain a consistent tone 
among members regarding the incident, even when 
faced with information that conflicted with the group’s 
shared understanding of the incident. This was an 
important condition for groups with high levels of 
collective security efficacy. Groups with higher levels 
of cohesiveness had members with more rigid 
perspectives on the theft incident and on the efforts of 
the HRO’s security department. One employee notes 
his group’s consistent sentiment about the HRO’s 
security department’s work with them: 
I do think we are a very close-knit group. Right 
now, we are having a problem with the public 
machines. They [HRO security department] 
were getting updated to Windows 7, and they 
told us that it would take about a week…I think 
we have ten machines that are finished, a 
couple that don’t work at all, and most of them 
still have not been done. So it’s kind of like it’s 
us against them. We’re kind of pushing them to 
solve this problem. 
Another employee also comments about her 
group’s cohesiveness, suggesting that the group’s 
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unity allows it to be more relaxed about but still 
conscious of security threats:  
Yeah. We’re a lot more relaxed. Because I trust 
you, or whoever in this area, I probably am 
more apt to leave my office door open when I 
run across the hall because I know somebody’s 
here. If I didn’t have that, I probably would be 
a little more guarded. 
We also found that one of the ways in which highly 
effective groups ensured the sharing of perspectives 
across their members was through both formal and 
informal social influence. The formal social pressures 
were evident in how the HRO distributed policies among 
group members, while the informal social pressures were 
reminders from within the groups to act according to the 
formal policies. One employee comments: 
I look not only at the ones who are the social 
leader, rah-rah type, but also the ones that have 
respect (within the community). People respect 
them, and if they say this is something we need 
to do or try to get behind something, they will 
probably have buy-in. The biggest factor in 
security is how serious your leadership takes it. 
It’s their investment in people, time, and money. 
They influence it (security) in two ways: (1) by 
what they do, and (2) by influencing others—
some individuals are more influential than 
others because they have garnered respect over 
time. People were mad and were tired of stuff 
getting stolen; no one was thinking about our 
security, and so my boss (a community 
employee of her community) said…we gotta do 
something. 
Another employee echoes the importance of an 
informal social influence:  
[When a security incident occurs…I think of 
people that are seen as the informal social 
leader of the community. There’s people in 
formal roles, but there’s also people that 
informally are...like you have to run something 
through them. 
In September 2013, the task force presented an 
additional series of recommendations to improve the 
existing security policies and infrastructure. The task 
force evaluated evidence from the incident and 
composed a series of social and managerial policy and 
procedure recommendations, including (1) increased 
community awareness of social engineering tactics, (2) 
policy development for visitor access, (3) increased 
community awareness of physical security (e.g., 
checking locked doors), and (4) sporadic inventory 
audits to more precisely identify theft timings. 
Furthermore, the security task force recommended 
security infrastructure modifications including: (1) 
automatic door locks for individual office doors, (2) 
digital office suite locks that could be remotely 
monitored and made time-sensitive for access, and (3) 
the expansion and upgrade of security camera 
infrastructure. Critical to the task force’s ability to 
make these recommendations was access to the 
organizational resources supplied by the employee 
group (e.g., incident reports), organizational policies 
on visitors and security awareness training, and reports 
on physical security maintenance and monitoring 
documentation. These resources provided additional 
context and understanding of the security incidents and 
the current effectiveness of the safeguards designed to 
protect the employee groups. 
When presenting to the employee groups, the task 
force selected the member with the greatest tenure 
within the organization and highest administrative title 
to ensure that the employee groups viewed the 
recommendations as legitimate; this indicates social 
capital plays a direct role in the informal social control 
a nonadministrative task force has on employee group 
behaviors. In the days during and immediately after the 
efforts of the task force, it became apparent that some 
employee groups had members who were far more 
informed, proactive, and resolute in their efforts to 
respond to the physical data theft incident than others. 
Across their respective members, these groups 
maintained a consistent perspective about the incident 
and a cohesive spirit toward assisting one another in 
executing the shared expectations for how to respond 
to the incident. As one employee mentions: 
When there is perhaps a common threat that is 
detected by several (community members), then 
we can each try to solve it individually on our 
own or we can collaborate and solve it 
collectively. Cooperation is the lifeblood of any 
collaborative effort (including security) 
because even if some portion of the group may 
not agree, they will cooperate because they are 
a member of the group and they would expect 
cooperation from others. 
The highly effective employee groups also drew 
frequently from the insights of their more experienced 
members and took steps to ensure that these insights 
and any new knowledge were processed within the 
group to make them accessible for future needs. We 
frequently observed groups leveraging institutional 
knowledge from senior employees to understand how 
best to approach the security incident, specifically how 
to interact and cooperate with the HRO’s security 
officials. These senior employees not only provided 
direction for the group, they also helped form a 
consensus within the group. For instance, a previous 
quote notes how one employee’s group would “run 
things past me and another member…just because we 
want to know how something works, why it works, is 
it possible”. These senior people acted as resources to 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
199 
 
help evaluate whether responses would align with the 
policies and goals of the HRO.  
Collectively, the social properties of these employee 
groups defined a framework for sharing experiences 
and insights among group members and helped define 
how the members should work together to resolve the 
physical security breach incident. These social 
properties also seemed to depend on the ecological 
properties of the group that first shaped the group’s 
structure and underlying collective capacity. Employees 
further note how ecological properties, such as turnover, 
directly impact social properties in terms of developing 
cohesion and social capital and fostering collaborative 
evaluation of security incidents: 
It takes time. When someone’s first just coming 
in, you don’t know how they may handle a 
particular situation…I think that trust is built 
over time…You’ve got to develop some type of 
relationship with them. You’ve got to be able to 
understand them to a certain extent, and then 
you’re able to come to some common ground. 
Cumulatively, the social properties of social ties, social 
capital, cohesion, cultural attenuation, and social 
control describe the social forces that shape how 
information and events are interpreted by employee 
groups and establish the norms for their members’ 
actions in response to security incidents. Presented in 
Table 6, we carried forward these social properties 
from the SDT and found each one to be pertinent to the 
collective security efficacy phenomenon.  
Table 6. Social Properties Salient to an Employee Group’s Collective Security Efficacy 
Social properties Definition 
Social ties The social channels that facilitate the exchange of resources among employees within an employee group 
Social capital 
The intangible resources produced via relationships among employees 
that facilitate action for the mutual benefit of the employee group in terms 
of structural, relational, and cognitive capital 
Cohesion An employee group’s propensity to demonstrate resiliency against disruptive forces 
Cultural attenuation The extent to which normative conventions can be interpreted incorrectly and influence employee behavior within the employee group 
Social control The formal and informal societal or political influences that shape and govern an employee group 
Beyond the set of ecological and social properties 
espoused in the SDT, a set of social properties emerged 
that were specific to an employee group’s collective 
security efficacy. These social properties became more 
apparent as the investigation into the physical breach 
security incident progressed. In terms of the new 
knowledge that was brought into the groups for 
refining their shared perspective of the security 
incident, the effective groups had members who 
collectively reflected on the incident and cooperatively 
searched for explanations for how the incident 
occurred and how it could be prevented in the future. 
As one employee comments: 
I think as a group, we tried to collectively 
understand the root cause of the attack. We all 
looked at the documentary evidence and our 
interactions with relevant employees that had 
information that could help us to understand 
what happened. It led us to raise questions 
about whether the attack was our responsibility 
and how we should approach others about it.  
Furthermore, the task force heavily relied on 
organizational resources, such as policy databases, 
incident reports compiled by security personnel, and 
infrastructure blueprints, to understand the physical 
and logical security context. As a result, organizational 
memory emerged through direct observation of the 
task force and the employee groups that sought 
additional organizational resources to better 
understand existing policies and security procedures. 
Through the thematic analysis of our interview data, 
collective induction and collective reflection also 
emerged as employee group properties relating to the 
collective security efficacy phenomenon. These 
properties are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7. Emergent Social Properties Salient to an Employee Group’s Collective Security Efficacy 
Emergent social properties Definition 
Organizational memory The mechanisms, functions, or actions taken by the employee group to encode, store, or retrieve 
employee knowledge. 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups follow a formal data management process to 
ensure detailed information is available to the organization. 
• High-performing employee groups are able to quickly access information or 
knowledge from appropriate personnel. 
• High-performing employee groups utilize synthesized information or knowledge 
provided by the organization to accomplish their work tasks. 
Collective induction The cooperative search for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory generalizations, rules, and 
principles. 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups make strong efforts to collectively identify and 
define security problems. 
• High-performing employee groups frequently seek out specific information relevant 
to security problems. 
Collective reflection The intellectual cooperation of employees, through which information is created, becomes 
meaningful and is translated and transformed into new information. 
Indicator(s): 
• High-performing employee groups indicate they often take an introspective approach 
toward security. 
• High-performing employee groups frequently analyze and question why they do 
things regarding the security of their organization. 
• High-performing employee groups often explore the abstract implications of security 
on organizational operations. 
Finally, our interviews also provide evidence of how 
an employee group’s collective security efficacy 
influenced the actions of its members, increasing their 
effectiveness in responding to security incidents. For 
instance, when asked to describe how the synthesized 
knowledge of security issues, incidents, and policies 
within his group influenced the security actions of his 
group’s members, one employee notes:  
I just believe the nature of being part of a group 
brings some accountability. I think there’s a lot 
to be said for the collective mentality of honesty 
or integrity or appropriate behaviors, and I 
think in that way we all influence one another. 
Another employee also comments on the translation of 
collective efficacy into security outcomes: 
A good practice we just started that emerged 
from the group is we now try to shred that stuff 
that you can that you’re no longer using. We 
knew we had to do something with this paper 
instead of just throwing it out in the trash, so 
we go to the shredder. 
The previous anecdotes provide examples of how 
highly functioning groups with high levels of collective 
security efficacy increased the effectiveness of their 
members’ security responses. Poorly functioning 
groups, whose ecological and social properties did not 
support a high level of collective security efficacy, 
demonstrated less-effective security response outcomes 
among their members. One employee notes: 
Everything is basically about business to a 
point because we don’t really know each other. 
If I knew you well enough, I’d close your door. 
If I don’t know you…if I don’t feel that that 
would bother you because of one reason or 
another, I would say, “You’ve got your papers 
sitting out on your desk”, and the next question 
would be “Why the hell are you worried about 
my papers on my desk?” You don’t want that 
conversation to get started, so you just kind of 
back up off of it. 
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Perhaps the clearest example of collective security 
efficacy playing a direct role in security effectiveness 
is the physical data breach incident. Two affected 
employee groups—research team and administrative 
services in the business development work units—each 
identified security issues by questioning the existing 
security policies regarding visitor access to the 
physical building. These actions led to modifications 
in the security policies for visitor access. No further 
physical data breaches occurred once the HRO 
implemented this new policy, suggesting the employee 
groups effectively addressed their security concerns 
and placed new safeguards for the protection of 
physical data and personnel.  
In summary, our findings indicate that nearly all the 
original sets of ecological and social properties 
espoused by the SDT were instrumental in shaping an 
employee group’s collective ability to respond to an 
information security incident. The interviews, though, 
do not mention the ecological property of diversity, 
and we did not observe it as relevant to an employee 
group’s collective security efficacy. The findings also 
reveal the presence of new influential ecological and 
social properties; the social properties of a community 
depend on the community’s ecological properties. 
These emergent properties expand our understanding 
of the ecological and social properties that influence a 
group’s collective security efficacy.  
6 Discussion 
The ability of an organization to respond to 
information security incidents is influenced by the 
various groups of employees that emerge from within 
its borders. In this study, we sought to understand why 
some employee groups are more capable than others in 
recognizing and responding to information security 
incidents in a manner that is consistent with the 
organization’s collective security efficacy. The vast 
majority of information security research focuses on 
the individual level, resulting in a gap within the 
literature at the group level. To the best of our 
knowledge, the current study is one of the first to 
identify the properties of an employee group that 
contribute to the organization’s collective security 
efficacy. As such, we make several contributions to the 
literature. Employee groups are often cited in the 
information security literature, but neither defined nor 
characterized, much less studied as a key ingredient in 
an organization’s response to an information security 
incident. In this study, we advanced this 
understanding. We also responded to the challenge of 
editorial boards for new perspectives on information 
security, beyond those of just the individual (Belanger 
& Crossler, 2011; Bélanger & Xu, 2015; Siponen et al., 
2008; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). 
The formation of an employee group’s collective 
security efficacy reveals much about its ecological and 
social underpinnings. Organizational employee groups 
are logically organized and socially constructed as 
much as they depend on the physical structures 
imposed by the organization (Berger & Luckmann, 
1991). The SDT has evolved from its original context 
of geographically bounded neighborhood community 
structures—including the macroconditions, such as 
poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential 
turnover—that influence these structures and govern 
social activity within the communities. In the 
organizational context, these properties give way to a 
different set of ecological and social properties that 
align with the shared digital and social infrastructure 
that connects employee groups across an organization. 
We contribute to the research on collective efficacy by 
providing a more holistic understanding of the 
employee group’s properties and how they influence 
its ability to respond to security incidents in a manner 
that is consistent with its organizational goals and 
objectives, a context previously unexamined.  
Our findings show that employee groups within a 
broader organization act uniquely in their collective 
responses to information security incidents. Even 
though an organization has overarching security 
policies and procedures that dictate how security 
incidents should be approached, each group may form 
its own interpretation and enforcement of the policies 
that influence its members’ responses to incidents 
differently because of variation in the ecological and 
social properties held by employee groups. This 
finding points to a security incident response as 
something that is practiced at a functional or social 
level rather than at the broader organizational level. 
Security incident responses are established in 
employee groups, and those groups will reinforce or 
deviate from one another with the cumulative result 
being some level of incident response that aligns more 
or less to the desired security goals and objectives of 
the organization. Although organizations design 
security incident response procedures to govern 
security incident response activities within 
organizations, the current research demonstrates that 
the actual implementation of the procedures occurs at 
the group level across multiple employee groups 
within an organization. Consequently, the present 
study challenges the notion that a single-level 
perspective can adequately explain an organization’s 
security incident response. Specifically, this study 
indicates a multilevel perspective may best explain an 
organization’s ability to respond to security incidents. 
Our results suggest a close agreement with the general 
property sets and the triadic and reciprocal associations 
among these sets; an employee group’s collective 
security efficacy is a product of (1) the ecological 
factors that define its membership, how its members 
become aware of an incident, and the foundation for its 
members’ social exchanges relative to the incident; 
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and (2) the social properties that establish the social 
structure of an employee group when presented with a 
security incident. Of the ecological properties 
identified as salient to an employee group’s collective 
security efficacy, educational attainment and 
homogeneity emerged from our thematic analysis of 
the interview data as an important property. 
Organizational memory, collective induction, and 
collective reflection also emerged as salient social 
properties beyond those previously established in the 
SDT literature. Collective induction and collective 
reflection are the qualities of an employee group that 
allow it to respond to unfamiliar threats, and these 
qualities rely on the employee group’s organizational 
memory, social ties, social capital, cohesion, cultural 
attenuation, and social controls to provide guidance for 
similar incidents. By providing precision to the 
definitions of the traditional ecological and social 
properties and the associations among those properties, 
uncovering new ecological and social properties within 
the context of an employee group’s collective security 
efficacy, we expand the range of phenomena applicable 
to the SDT and provide the information security 
discipline with a group-level lens with which to examine 
security incident responses within organizational settings. 
6.1 Limitations 
Given the single-site case study approach, the 
generalizability of our results is a concern. We 
partially chose a single-site case study because of the 
extensive level of access given to the authors in terms 
of interview time, direct observation of real-time 
events, and internal organizational documents 
concerning security incidents and group behavior. The 
organization investigated in this study is a complex 
healthcare operations and research facility, creating a 
unique mixture of regulations and security compliance 
concerns that may produce security-conscious 
employees atypical in comparison to other types of 
organizations. Moreover, our case study approach 
provides a richer, more descriptive understanding of 
the groups within the organization, including how 
employees worked together to mitigate security 
threats. Nonetheless, the research design does present 
a limitation due to the narrow contextualization of the 
findings to a single organization and the possibility that 
other organizations would not function in a similar 
manner. Future research should seek to replicate the 
findings of the current study in a variety of 
organizations and possibly conduct a quantitative test 
of the theoretical model derived from the current study. 
This will ensure the generalizability of the collective 
security efficacy model and test the proposed 
constructs and their associations. 
Another limitation of this study concerns its focus on a 
single-group perspective; that is, the focus we asked 
employees to place on a single employee group 
throughout the interview. As described earlier, an 
employee can belong to multiple employee groups—
or subgroups for that matter—and each group will 
impart its influence on the individual employee. For 
instance, a few employees referenced groups that 
included individuals—such as janitorial staff or other 
employees—who are more commonly associated with 
a geographic location or organizational entity (e.g., IT 
department) than defined as being members of their 
employee group. Because the focus of this study 
ultimately narrows the discussion to a focal employee 
group, it is possible that employees possess multiple 
employee groups or could extend their employee 
groups under certain security incident situations (e.g., 
physical versus electronic incidents), suggesting the 
need for further examination of how employee groups 
influence collective security incident response 
efficacy. In fact, our direct observations of the task 
force suggest that the artifacts created from other 
employee groups (e.g., the security personnel reports 
and security infrastructure blueprints that were 
operationalized as the organizational memory social 
property) could have impacted an employee group’s 
understanding of the security incident. However, 
because this is the first study to attempt to capture the 
determinants of a group’s collective security efficacy 
and how that efficacy influences its response to 
security incidents, we placed intergroup and subgroup 
influences outside the study’s scope, but argue that 
such research is a necessary next step in understanding 
employee groups and how they influence the security 
outcomes for their members and firms.  
7 Conclusion 
The current study shifts the focus of security incident 
responses from an individual level to a group level, and 
by doing this, we see that the success of an 
organization when responding to an incident depends 
on its employee groups and the groups’ influence on 
their respective members. From a practice perspective, 
one important bridge between the two levels appears to 
be the organizational agent representing the 
hierarchical structure of an organization within the 
group. With the formal social structure of an employee 
group having such an impact on its collective ability to 
respond to a security incident, employees see security 
as an organizational problem, something that is being 
pushed on them as opposed to something in which they 
see themselves having an integral role. For this reason, 
it is imperative that information security managers 
understand their organization’s employees and the various 
groups with which they are associated, as well as how these 
groups interpret security incidents and their organization’s 
expectations regarding employee response. 
Although prior research suggests the importance of 
developing the individual employee, our findings 
suggest that it takes an employee group—a village—to 
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be successful when responding to information security 
incidents. Policies may establish the expectations of 
incident response behavior among employees, but how 
these expectations are ultimately fulfilled is 
determined at both the individual and group levels 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002). Employees engage in 
policy-prescribed incident response behavior based on 
the individual-level influence of a number of 
individual-level factors, including policy awareness, 
deterrence factors, threat and efficacy perceptions, and 
normative beliefs, among others. However, the 
incident response success of an organization also 
depends on the interactive, coordinative, and 
synergistic capabilities of the organization’s 
employees in the form of employee groups. In many 
ways, the social fabric of an organization may 
represent the single greatest asset it has when 
responding to security incidents. Although the quality 
of each individual thread (employee) has proven to be 
an important component to security threat mitigation, 
interlaced threads (an employee group) may be able to 
mitigate the weaknesses of a single thread to ensure 
that the organization responds to security incidents in 
an appropriate and effective manner. 
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Appendix A:  SDT Contextualization 
We followed the theory contextualization guidelines provided by Hong, Chan, Thong, Chasalow, and Dhillon (2014) 
to contextualize the applicable ecological and social properties provided by the SDT. Specifically, we heed the advice 
of Hong et al. (2014) (Guideline 2) to first identify a set of core constructs with which to contextualize our specified 
research domain. To aid in this effort, we leveraged the extensive and mature SDT literature to provide guidance for 
which properties would be the most relevant to a new research domain. However, our synthesis of the SDT literature 
found that researchers present a vast set of properties. A core model appears to be sensitive to the unique contextual 
elements of each particular study.  
Because information systems (IS) and information security scholars have not adopted the SDT as a theoretical lens in 
prior research, and information security research has primarily focused on the individual level of analysis rather than 
the group level, we took a conservative approach to the narrowing down of the SDT’s properties. We primarily focused 
on how the properties would translate to an organizational context. To cast this wider net concerning the core 
constructs, we relied on Kubrin and Wietzer’s (2003) review of the SDT literature. We then followed the advice of 
Hong et al. (2014) and Zahra (2007) to relax the assumptions of the SDT to ensure its properties would fit the new 
research domain. In doing so, we contribute to the criminology literature in terms of added generalizability by 
identifying a core set of properties for the SDT in security-based research, identifying potential extensions to the SDT 
when studied from a new research domain and disciplinary perspective, and establishing the relevance of the SDT to 
a new discipline. 
One key assumption of the SDT is that neighborhoods are social structures defined by geographic boundaries and 
various macroconditions—such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential turnover—that influence and govern 
social activity within the communities. By relaxing the geographic boundary assumption, we account for how our focal 
phenomenon involves employee groups that are bound less by physical structures and more by logical and social ones. 
Employee groups are logically organized and socially constructed as much as they depend on the physical structures 
imposed by the organization (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). For instance, within a geographically bounded residential 
community, the SDT defines socioeconomic status as the economic and social position of a community in terms of its 
residents’ education, income, and occupational status (Schulz et al., 2012; Winkleby & Cubbin, 2003). Contextualized 
to an organizational incident response context, the definition is quite similar, referencing employees instead of 
residents. 
Additionally, the SDT has previously assumed a residential environment. Because membership in employee groups is 
influenced by more than just physical proximity and is subject to logical roles, administrative hierarchy, and the social 
structures within the organization, we must consider the social and logical perspectives when mapping the SDT’s 
constructs, associations, values, and events to the collective security efficacy phenomenon. For example, SDT-based 
research has primarily focused on physical crimes against the community, such as theft, vandalism, and armed robbery, 
and scholars criticize the SDT for ignoring lesser offenses that may lead to more serious threats if left unchecked. We 
must also anticipate an organizational environment largely influenced by digital information and communication 
networks and negligent or malicious actions by employees or those responsible for monitoring security. These are 
considerations that motivate our contextualization of the SDT to employee groups and their collective security efficacy. 
The original and contextualized SDT ecological and social properties, along with their respective definitions and 
rationales for inclusion or contextualization, are included in Table A1. 
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Table A1. Contextualization of SDT-Espoused Community Properties 
SDT-espoused community 
properties 
Contextualized SDT-espoused  
employee group properties 
Rationale for inclusion or 
contextualization to the 
organizational context 
Ecological properties 
Socioeconomic status: The 
economic and social position of a 
community in terms of its residents’ 
education, income, and 
occupational status (Schulz et al., 
2012; Winkleby & Cubbin, 2003). 
Socioeconomic status: The economic 
and social position of an employee 
group in terms of its members’ 
education, income, and occupational 
status/rank within the organization. 
In the SDT, socioeconomic status (SES) 
is bounded within the physical 
geography of a neighborhood and 
relates to the variation in the 
community’s economic status (e.g., 
poverty). SES unbinds the physical 
constraint to a conceptual boundary of 
an organization and the variation in 
employee economic status. 
Residential instability: The degree 
of turnover among neighborhood 
residents (Drukker, Kaplan, & van 
Os, 2005). 
Turnover: The degree to which members 
of an employee group transfer, resign, 
retire, or are terminated from their 
position within the group. 
Residential instability is bounded within 
the physical geography of a 
neighborhood and is primarily driven by 
resident choice. Turnover can be driven 
by organization or employee choice and 
is not tied to a physical boundary (e.g., 
transition within organization to new 
community). 
Ethnic heterogeneity: The degree of 
ancestral, social, cultural, or 
national diversity among 
neighborhood residents (Sampson 
& Groves, 1989). 
Diversity: The degree to which a group 
is comprised of employees that identify 
with one or more socioecological group 
(Ely & Thomas, 2001), including 
professionally affiliated groups, 
departments, task workgroups, and so 
forth. 
Ethnic heterogeneity focuses on a 
singular differentiation point when 
comparing neighborhood residents 
while diversity is an overall 
representation of the individual 
differences within an organizational 
structure (e.g., gender, ethnicity, cultural 
affiliation, and sexual orientation). 
Social properties 
Social ties: The information-
carrying connections among 
neighborhood residents (Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003; Shaw & McKay, 
1942). 
Social ties: The social channels that 
facilitate the exchange of resources 
among the employees within a group 
(Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004). 
The concept of social ties maintains a 
common meaning in both neighborhood 
and organizational settings. 
Social capital: The intangible 
resources produced in “relations 
among neighborhood residents that 
facilitate action” for mutual benefit 
(Coleman, 1988; Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003, p. 377). 
Social capital: The intangible resources 
produced via relationships among 
employees that facilitate action for the 
mutual benefit of the group (Coleman, 
1988) in terms of structural, relational, 
and cognitive capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). 
The SDT literature has various 
definitions of social capital. In an 
organization, social capital aligns with a 
definition that focuses on mutual 
benefits achieved through the 
relationships among employees. 
Cohesion: The degree to which 
neighborhood residents work 
together as a united entity 
(Markowitz et al., 2001). 
Cohesion: The degree to which 
members of an employee group work 
together as a united entity against 
disruptive forces (Markowitz et al., 
2001; Ronayne, 2004). 
Cohesion in the SDT refers to close-knit 
ties of neighbors within a 
geographically bounded location. 
Cohesion in organizations focuses on 
the perceptions of closeness in terms of 
harmony and trust among employees. 
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Table A1. Contextualization of SDT-Espoused Community Properties 
Cultural attenuation: The degree to 
which the conventional values of a 
neighborhood are valued by its 
residents and are able to impose 
informal social control 
(Kornhauser, 1978).  
Cultural attenuation: The extent to 
which normative conventions can be 
interpreted correctly and influence 
employee behavior within an employee 
group. 
Cultural influence in the SDT has two 
approaches: (1) cultural heterogeneity 
(divergent value systems), and (2) 
cultural attenuation (ability of 
conventional values to provide informal 
social control). 
Social control: The societal or 
political influences that shape and 
govern the behavior of 
neighborhood residents (Kubrin & 
Weitzer, 2003).  
There are two types of social 
control: 
1.  Formal social control: The 
practices of the authorities to 
maintain order and enforce legal 
and regulatory codes. 
2. Informal Social Control: 
The degree to which 
neighborhood residents engage 
in efforts to prevent or sanction 
disorderly or criminal conduct 
through informal surveillance 
and direct intervention. 
Social control: The societal or political 
influences that shape and govern the 
behavior of employee group members.  
There are two types of social control: 
1. Formal social control: The 
practices of an employee group’s 
leaders to maintain order and enforce 
legal and regulatory codes. 
2. Informal social control: The 
degree to which members of an 
employee group engage in efforts to 
prevent or sanction disorderly or 
criminal conduct through informal 
surveillance and direct intervention 
in problems. 
Social control in the SDT focuses on 
informal control mechanisms through 
alignment with cultural norms. Social 
control in organizations can be 
determined by top-down enforcement 
(formal control) and peer enforcement 
(informal control). 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Unless noted otherwise, the interviewee gave the italicized examples when prompted for further clarification.  
Demographics: 1. Please state your gender. 2. Please state your level of education. 3. Please state your tenure with your employer. 4. Please state your race. 
Study Summary Statement: 
The current study focuses on the collective security efficacy of employee groups (the ability of an employee group to 
adequately manage a security issue when present). An employee group can be defined as collections of individuals 
who “are interdependent because of the tasks they perform as members of a group, who are embedded in one or more 
larger social systems (e.g. community, organization), and who perform tasks that affect others (such as customers or 
coworkers)” (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996, p. 308). As such, an employee group can be interpreted widely, so we would 
like you to first describe your employee group. 
Theme Questions: 1. Are your fellow group members compensated at a rate that is better than, consistent with, or less than what other 
organizations would pay for this amount and quality of work? 
a. How does variation in pay level influence security actions within the group? 2. How does the variance in employee education levels influence the security actions within your group? 3. How does the diversity of job roles (managerial, professional, administrative, skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled) 
influence the security actions within your group? 4. How does your group’s governance structure (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid) influence the security actions 
within the group? 5. How would you describe the social involvement of your group’s members? (e.g., group lunch meetings, cocktails 
after work, social clubs / sports, etc.) 6. How do the social ties within your group influence the security actions within the group? 
a. How do social groups and leaders influence security actions within the group? 
b. How does harmony in the group influence the security actions within the group? (e.g., groups 
generally agree with each other) 
c. How does benevolence influence the security actions within the group? (e.g., show compassion or 
empathy toward others) 
d. How does integrity influence the security actions within the group? (e.g., honest or truthful with one 
another in sharing information) 7. How do the combined abilities of the members of your group influence the security actions within the group? 8. How does your group support its members in accomplishing security actions? 
a. How does cohesion influence the security actions within the group? 9. How does your group encourage its employees to work together to accomplish security goals? 10. How are security policies interpreted within your group? 11. How would you describe the quality of the communication of security policies within your group?  12. How does your group make accessible to you the knowledge about security issues, incidents, and policies?  13. How does synthesized knowledge of security issues, incidents, and policies influence the security actions within 
your group? (Question added based on the emergence of organizational memory.) 
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a. How does organizational memory influence the security actions within the group? (Question added 
based on the emergence of organizational memory.) (e.g., learning management systems, policy 
databases, document repositories, etc.) 
b. How does monitoring (such as tracking web usage, access to physical resources, etc.) influence the 
security actions within the group? 
c. How does the use of metaphors and heuristics influence the security actions within the group? (e.g., 
storytelling by employees, rules of thumb, etc.) 14. How do your peers influence the security actions within your group? 15. What factors do you perceive to have the greatest influence on the security actions within your group? 
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